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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—PROBATIONARY SEARCHES:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS CELL
PHONE SEARCHES OF PROBATIONERS
State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106, 862 N.W.2d 535
ABSTRACT
In State v. Gonzalez, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
probationers are subject to warrantless searches of their cell phones
pursuant to their probationary conditions and a finding of reasonable
suspicion. The court concluded that since Gonzalez’s probationary terms
allowed for a search of his residence and vehicle, the search would
reasonably allow for the searching of items—which could contain
evidence—within these locations. Since the cell phones found were items
within the confines of his residence and vehicle, the search of the cell
phones was upheld as a reasonable probationary search. This case
demonstrates the broad search powers the State is afforded when a search is
deemed a probationary search. This decision has significant implications
because cell phone searches of probationers may be a stepping stone to
other warrantless “special needs” searches of cell phones in North Dakota.
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FACTS

In January of 2004, Garron Gonzalez pled guilty to two counts of gross
sexual imposition.1 In addition to incarceration, Gonzalez was sentenced to
five years of probation.2 His probationary terms, in part, required that “he
submit to a search of his vehicle or place of residence by any probation
officer at any time of the day or night.”3 Additional terms included not
having unsupervised contact with females under eighteen or possessing
sexually stimulating materials.4
In December of 2010, the Mandan Police Department notified
Gonzalez’s probation officer that Gonzalez was being investigated for
having contact with a minor.5 Pursuant to this information, the probation
officer and law enforcement searched Gonzalez’s residence and vehicle.6
Ultimately, the officers seized two smartphone cell phones found in his

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106, ¶ 2, 862 N.W.2d 535, 538.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
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residence and vehicle—one in each—believing that they contained evidence
of contact with a minor.7 After seizing the phones, the probation officer
accessed the phones and looked through them.8 Subsequently, the officer
found evidence of Gonzalez violating his probationary terms and arrested
Gonzalez.9 Notably, the probation officer also searched the phones at a
later date to compile further evidence against Gonzalez.10
The State alleged Gonzalez had violated two conditions of his
probation: no contact with a minor under the age of eighteen and no
possessing sexually stimulating material.11 The district court agreed
Gonzalez violated his conditions and revoked Gonzalez’s probation.12 As a
result, the court resentenced him to twenty years, to run consecutively, on
his two gross sexual imposition charges.13
In August of 2012, Gonzalez filed an application for post-conviction
release, and the district court ordered a new hearing for the petition of
revocation.14 Prior to this hearing, Gonzalez filed a motion to suppress
evidence.15 The evidence he wished to suppress was the information
obtained from the cell phone searches.16 His basis for the suppression was
that the State violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a search
without a warrant or one reasonable pursuant to his probationary terms.17
The court denied the motion because “Gonzalez had notice that any of his
personal effects were subject to the search condition and the warrantless
search of the cell phones was reasonable.”18 On appeal, Gonzalez argued
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence based
upon what his probationary terms stated, the unreasonableness of the
search, and by violating his Fourth Amendment rights.19
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution protects citizens from

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. ¶ 29, 862 N.W.2d at 543.
11. Id. ¶ 5, 862 N.W.2d at 538.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. ¶ 6.
15. Id. ¶ 7.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id. ¶ 10, 862 N.W.2d at 539.

428

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91:425

unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.20 The general rule
regarding searches and seizures is that law enforcement must obtain a
search warrant to either conduct a search or seize evidence.21 However, a
warrant may not be necessary if the search in question falls within one of
the recognized exceptions to the search warrant rule.22
A. CONDITIONS OF PROBATIONERS
One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is
searches of probationers.23 Therefore, probationers can be the subject of a
search without the need to first receive a search warrant.24 The rationale for
this exception is that probationers are afforded less privacy than an
ordinary, law-abiding citizen.25 Probationers have demonstrated their
willingness to commit a crime and harm society; therefore, the government
has a legitimate interest in preventing further harm from a known
perpetrator.26 As a result, probationers are commonly subjected to abridged
freedoms, such as a reduction in privacy in the form of relaxed warrant
requirements on searches.27
In North Dakota, courts can “[s]ubmit the defendant’s person, place of
residence, or vehicle to search and seizure by a probation officer at any time
of the day or night, with or without a search warrant” by stating so in the
probationer’s terms.28 Furthermore, once a search is underway, the courts
have allowed items found within the enumerated search area to be searched
as well, even though the terms of probation did not explicitly list the item.29
In United States v. Yuknavich,30 a federal appellate court allowed a
computer within a probationer’s residence to be searched.31 While the
computer was not explicitly listed under the term of probation, the court
allowed the additional search of the computer because the terms of
probation stated that the probationer’s internet usage would be monitored.32
Therefore, the item searched must be related to the underlying crime or the

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8.
See State v. Hurt, 2007 ND 192, ¶ 6, 743 N.W.2d 102, 104.
Id.
See State v. Adams, 2010 ND 184, ¶ 12, 788 N.W.2d 619, 623.
See id. ¶¶ 11-12.
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001).
See id. at 120-21.
See id. at 121-22.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07, -07(4)(n) (2015).
State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106, ¶ 17, 862 N.W.2d, 535, 540.
419 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2005).
Yuknavich, 419 F.3d at 1311.
See id. at 1310-11.
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probationary terms, as the probationer should have notice of the possible
searches they may be subjected to during probation.33
B. REASONABLENESS
Additionally, the search must have been reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness standard.34
Under the reasonableness
standard, courts “assess[], on the one hand, the degree to which [the search
or seizure] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”35 Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
warrantless search of a probationer, supported by reasonable suspicion and
pursuant to a probationer’s conditions, satisfies the reasonableness standard
of the Fourth Amendment.36
III. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS
Justice Sandstrom delivered the opinion of the court in Gonzalez.37
Notably, the court analyzed four issues. First, whether the terms of
Gonzalez’s probation gave law enforcement the right to search his cell
phones.38 Second, whether cell phones of probationers are afforded more
protection than other personal property.39 Third, whether the probation
officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search.40 Fourth, whether
the subsequent searches of the cell phones days later were lawful.41 The
court affirmed the district court on all issues and ruled in favor of the
State.42
A. EQUATING CELL PHONES TO CONTAINERS
Gonzalez’s cell phones were valid search items because they were
found within Gonzalez’s residence and vehicle, which could be searched
according to Gonzalez’s probationary terms.43 While the cell phones were
33. Gonzalez, ¶ 18, 862 N.W.2d at 540-41.
34. See id. ¶ 25, 862 N.W.2d at 542.
35. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
36. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
37. Justice Sandstrom was joined by the entirety of the court: Justices Crothers, McEvers,
Kapsner (concurring in the result only), and Chief Justice VandeWalle. Gonzalez, ¶ 32, 862
N.W.2d at 543.
38. Id. ¶ 14, 862 N.W.2d at 539-40.
39. Id. ¶ 20, 862 N.W.2d at 541.
40. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 862 N.W.2d at 542.
41. Id. ¶ 28, 862 N.W.2d at 543.
42. Id. ¶ 31.
43. Id. ¶ 16, 862 N.W.2d at 540.
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not explicitly listed under his terms, common sense and precedent dictate
that containers found within the listed areas must also be allowed to be
searched as well.44 If the court ignored this rationale, “[A] probation officer
could search [the probationer’s] house or vehicle and seize any evidence
found in plain sight but would not be authorized to search anything located
in the house or vehicle where evidence of a probation violation may be
contained . . . .”45
In Adams, a safe found within a residence—although not expressly
stated in the probationer’s conditions46—was allowed to be searched
without a warrant, pursuant to the probationer’s terms.47 The Adams court,
much like the Gonzalez court, stated that “[t]o conclude the search [of the
safe] was unreasonable would give probationers the ability to effectively
render warrantless probation searches meaningless, because probationers
could avoid warrantless searches merely by securing items in a locked
box.”48 Notably, the court’s treatment of containers found in probationary
searches is quite similar to containers found in cars, pursuant to a search
incident to an arrest or under the automobile exception.49 Ultimately, the
Gonzalez court ruled that searching items that are related to the underlying
offense and within an enumerated area under the terms of probation, such as
cell phones, puts the probationer on notice and is a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment.50
B. DISTINGUISHING RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
The court also disagreed with Gonzalez that probationer’s cell phones
are held to a higher standard of protection than most personal property.51
Essentially, Gonzalez argues cell phones contain details about many aspects
of people’s lives, from personal to professional, and to hold them out as an

44. See id. ¶ 17.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. The probationer’s terms in Adams included a search of her person, residence, vehicle, or
any accessible property. State v. Adams, 2010 ND 184, ¶ 2, 788 N.W.2d 619, 621.
47. Id. ¶ 17, 788 N.W.2d at 625.
48. Id.
49. The search incident to arrest exception allows law enforcement to conduct a warrantless
search of an arrestee and their immediate area for weapons or evidence, contemporaneous with the
arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Illinois v. Lafayette expanded this
search to containers. 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983). The automobile exception (or Carroll Doctrine)
allows law enforcement to execute a warrantless search of a vehicle if the officer has probable
cause that evidence of a crime is present within the vehicle. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 149 (1925). California v. Acevedo allowed searches of containers in vehicles as long as
probable cause existed for the container as well. 500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991).
50. Gonzalez, ¶ 18, 862 N.W.2d at 540-41.
51. See id. ¶¶ 20-22, 862 N.W.2d at 541.
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ordinary piece of property is absurd.52 Therefore, Gonzalez contends that
cell phones require a warrant to be searched, even in the case of
probationers.53 To provide support for this proposition, Gonzalez relies on
Riley v. California.54 In Riley, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a cell
phone search pursuant to a search incident to an arrest was unreasonable
without a search warrant.55 The Riley Court reasoned, similarly as
Gonzalez did, that cell phones hold “the privacies of life” for numerous
people.56
However, as the Gonzalez court contends, the search incident exception
and the probation exception are quite different.57 One of the primary
reasons for the search incident exception is to protect an officer’s safety.58
Searches incident to an arrest were largely performed to ensure the arrestee
did not have a weapon that could be used to injure an arresting officer.59
Therefore, searching an arrestee’s cell phone is unlikely to address this
concern.60
Furthermore, probationary searches are performed only after an
individual is convicted of a crime; a search incident to an arrest, on the
other hand, is performed upon somebody who has only been arrested and is
a suspect of a crime.61 Probation is a sentence for committing a crime, and
the government has a legitimate interest in preventing further crime from
being committed.62 Not only does a probationer often consent to the terms
of probation in lieu of potential incarceration, but the State has the right to
use reasonable means to prevent further crimes from being committed.63
Therefore, especially when a search of a cell phone can produce significant
evidence of wrong-doing related to the underlying offense, the State’s
warrantless search of these items is permitted.64 The Riley Court
recognized the unique differences of the search incident exception by
stating, “[O]ther case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless

52. See Brief of Appellant at 19-20, State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106, 862 N.W.2d 535 (No.
20140213).
53. See Gonzalez, ¶ 20, 862 N.W.2d at 541.
54. Id.
55. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
56. Id. at 2494-95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
57. Gonzalez, ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 541.
58. Id. ¶ 21.
59. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
60. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484-85.
61. See Gonzalez, ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 541-42.
62. Id. at 542.
63. See id.
64. See id.
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search of a particular phone.”65 Due to the stark differences, the Gonzalez
court elected to distinguish Riley and ruled the cell phones fell within the
probation exception to the search warrant requirement.66
C. REASONABLENESS
The court also established reasonable suspicion, under the
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment, was present.67 The court
determined this by employing the totality of the circumstances test.68
Under this test, the court looked at whether the probation officer had
reasonable suspicion that Gonzalez was “engaging in unlawful activity.”69
If the requisite reasonable suspicion was present, the search of the cell
phones was reasonable.70
The court’s analysis largely fell on Gonzalez’s specific probationary
conditions and the pending investigation by the Mandan Police
Department.71 Since Gonzalez’s conditions stated he could not have
contact with minor, the investigation of him having contact with a minor
gave the probation officer enough suspicion to search Gonzalez’s residence,
vehicle, and any contents within these areas that may provide evidence that
Gonzalez violated his terms.72
D. SUBSEQUENT SEARCHES
Additionally, the court ruled the subsequent searches of the cell phones
in the days after the initial search did not violate Gonzalez’s rights under
the Fourth Amendment.73 After evidence was found on the phones of
Gonzalez violating his probationary conditions, he lacked a privacy interest
in them according to the court.74 Furthermore, additional searches of them,
after the fact, would not impede upon his rights.75 For support, the court
invoked the words used in United States v. Burnette, stating that “[o]nce an
item in an individual’s possession has been lawfully seized and searched,
subsequent searches of that item, so long as it remains in the legitimate

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
Gonzalez, ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 542.
Id. ¶ 27, 862 N.W.2d at 543.
Id.
Id.
See id. ¶ 26, 862 N.W.2d at 542.
See id. ¶ 27, 862 N.W.2d at 543.
See id. at 542-43.
Id. ¶ 30, 862 N.W.2d at 543.
Id. ¶ 29.
Id.
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uninterrupted possession of the police, may be conducted without a
warrant.”76
IV. IMPACT OF DECISION
The Gonzalez decision is likely one of many cases in the near future in
which the North Dakota Supreme Court will have to address a “cell phone”
search. Cell phones are no longer a simple means of communication; they
are an intimate part of a person’s life. This cuts both ways for law
enforcement. On the one hand, law enforcement has a way of gaining very
detailed information about an individual and any potential criminal
behavior; on the other hand, individuals may have a heightened expectation
of privacy with cell phones—such was the case in Riley.77 In which case,
law enforcement is not permitted from uncovering this information without
a warrant.
A. HOW CELL PHONES ARE TO BE VIEWED
One of the most interesting arguments made by the court in Gonzalez is
that cell phones are generally nothing more than containers.78 The court
essentially equates Gonzalez’s smartphone cell phones to the safe found in
Adams.79 Notably, a safe may contain important paperwork pertaining to an
individual, such as a passport, or conceal evidence of a crime, such as a bag
of marijuana. However, a safe generally does not have a contact list,
personal messages, photos, a browsing history, a GPS feature to track
previous locations, and “apps” that could give away intimate details about a
person’s life.80 For example, a weight-loss app likely displays a person’s
weight; a banking app may display a person’s finances; and a school-related
app can access a person’s grades.
The Riley Court recognized the inherent problems with equating a cell
phone to other personal property and determined one’s privacy interest in
cell phones is heightened.81 The North Dakota Supreme Court addresses
this issue in Gonzalez by claiming probationers, in general, have a
diminished expectation of privacy.82 Therefore, a probationer’s terms—
putting him or her on notice—and a probation officer’s reasonable
suspicion are enough to overcome what little expectations a probationer
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. (quoting United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1049 (9th Cir. 1983)).
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014).
See Gonzalez, ¶ 17, 862 N.W.2d at 540.
See id.
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
See id. at 2494-95.
See Gonzalez, ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 542.
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may have pertaining to a warrantless search of a cell phone.83 Should this
rationale be expanded to other warrantless searches?
B. INFLUENCE ON OTHER “SPECIAL NEEDS” SEARCHES IN NORTH
DAKOTA
The probation exception is but one exception to the warrant
requirement. Other such exceptions include search incident to arrest, the
automobile exception, inventory searches of vehicles, public employee
searches, school searches of students, or border searches, just to name a
Additionally, “the Supreme Court has held that certain
few.84
programmatic searches do not require a warrant or probable cause when
they are conducted in furtherance of a government ‘special need’ other than
investigation of criminal activity.”85 However, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has issued very few decisions on cell phone searches and none within
the contexts of these search exceptions, other than the Gonzalez decision.
Therefore, Gonzalez gave us an indication as to how North Dakota is going
to approach these types of cases.
Applying this “watered-down”
expectation of privacy approach to these “special needs” cases should allow
for more warrantless searches of cell phones, as long as the public official
has reasonable suspicion to believe a policy violation or crime has been
committed.
For example, it has been long recognized that students attending public
schools are not afforded their full constitutional rights due to the safety
concerns inherent in such a setting.86 It would seem, based on the Gonzalez
decision, that a warrantless search of a student’s cell phone—which many
grade-schoolers likely carry these days—would be valid, as long as the
teacher or other staff member had reasonable suspicion that the student was
violating a policy of the school or breaking a law. Therefore, something as
simple as texting in class—likely a violation of classroom policy—could
allow the teacher the ability to search through the student’s phone. This
hopefully would end once the teacher’s suspicions are confirmed or denied.
Likewise, public employees, such as a public university professor, could
also be subject to warrantless searches of their cell phones. While the
court’s decision in Gonzalez only applied to probationers, the court’s
analysis will likely pave the way for an expansion to these other “special
83. See id. ¶ 25, 862 N.W.2d at 542.
84. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, INVESTIGATIONS AND POLICE PRACTICES, 44 GEO.
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 48, 48 (2015).
85. Id. at 165.
86. Pat Garza, Privacy Policy: Riley v. California and Cellphone Searches in Schools, 78
TEX. B.J. 128, 129 (2015).
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needs” cases. In particular, students of public schools and public
employees could soon find themselves having their cell phones searched
without the need for a warrant.
V. CONCLUSION
In Gonzalez, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a warrantless
search of a probationer’s cell phones was reasonable, as long as supported
by reasonable suspicion and the terms of probation.87 The court
distinguished this case from the Riley decision by stating that “the
warrantless search of a cell phone under a probation search condition is
different from a search incident to arrest.”88 Notably, probationers enjoy a
diminished expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens. Since this
is a common theme in “special needs” cases, the court will have to decide
whether warrantless cell phone searches are limited to probationers or
extend to other “special needs” groups, such as students and public
employees.
Connor Melvie*

87. Gonzalez, ¶ 30, 862 N.W.2d at 543.
88. Id. ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 542.
* 2017 J.D. candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law. I would like to
dedicate this article to my family—Loren, Roxann, Brenden, and Devin. I also want to give a
special thanks to my elder brother for challenging my thoughts and ideas every step of the way,
for without which, I may not be where I am today.

